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The poor performance of the Soviet economy in 1987 was followed in
early 1988 by changes  in agricultural policy more fundamental than any
since collectivization.  Under the new Law on Cooperatives, collective
farms  [kolkhozy]  have the legal right to  decide what to produce, how to
manage their assets,  and to whom to  sell.  They can rent assets  in or out
on long term  leases  and enter into  contractual relations both with  farm
members  and nonmembers.  Collective farms  make their own plans and can
sell output  to any purchaser.  They can voluntarily contract with
procurement organs who,  in turn, use farms'  deliveries  to  fulfill  their
own state orders, but the  kolkhozy, themselves, are not legally required
to  take on state orders.  Marginal cost pricing, redefinition of price
zones, and explicit payments for  land use will be  introduced in 1990/91.
State  farms  reorganized as  amalgamations  of smaller cooperatives will
operate according to  the Law on Cooperatives, while those  that remain
sovkhozy  [state  farms]  will function under the New Law on the Enterprise,
with state orders.
These provisions are  a fundamental departure from  the limited changes
in earlier agricultural decrees during Gorbachev's tenure.  Furthermore,
rental  [arendnve]  contracts between farm administrators and family units
or small groups of workers  are being promoted instead of the more  limited
earlier collective contracts.  Under  the Law on Cooperatives,  these
smaller contracting units may, with the  farm's permission, become
independent cooperatives  in their own right.  This  is  a modern echo of
Stolypin's reform of 1906-1911, which allowed enterprising peasants to
move beyond the constraints  that communal  land tenure placed on
productivity and initiative.
Western economists observing the progress  of reform in the  Soviet
Union often express puzzlement that the Soviets have not followed the
"agriculture first"  strategy that seems  to have worked so well  in China.
The  first question put  to Soviet participants  in the Joint Soviet Economy
Roundtable in December, 1987, was  'Why not take agriculture first,  instead
of starting with  industry--the hardest sector of  all?'  (Aganbegyan, 1987,
p. 285).  The answers  from several Soviet participants included:  1) We did
start first with agriculture by establishing Gosagroprom and encouraging
introduction of  the collective contract;  2) Soviet agriculture  is  less
self sufficient than Chinese agriculture,  and more dependent on the  rest
of the economy for supply of inputs and processing of output,  so that
reform at  the  farm level cannot be  successful without changes  in industry;
and 3) We cannot postpone  industrial reform to wait for  improvement in
agriculture.
The second argument  is  a strong  one;  the  interlinkage between
agriculture and the  rest of  the Soviet  economy is  much greater  than was
the case prior to  the Chinese reform of  the  late 1970s.  Changes in
incentives  for the work force can accomplish only part of the needed
1increase  in productivity.  Much must come from better performance of off farm suppliers of inputs  and those who work  in processing, transport,  and retailing.  Yet potential gains  from improved incentives provided for  in the cooperative  legislation and the new rental contracts are  significant.
What happened in  1987  that brought land rent,  long  term leasing,
quasi-hired  labor, marginal cost pricing, and bankruptcy into  the  common parlance of agricultural policy?
One development was  the poor offering to consumers  despite  a good
grain harvest  in 1987.  Consumers  see little  immediate benefit  from good grain harvests,  since grain for food  has been  in adequate  supply  for years.  Deficits  in grain for feed affect  the  trade balance, costs of production for meat, and to  a lesser  extent, direct availability of dairy
products.  Only in extreme years will consumers be  affected directly and immediately by the  size of  the  grain harvest.  The good harvest of  1987 thus, while beneficial to  the economy  and morale of perestroika,  did
little to  reduce perceived shortages.  Meat production  increased 6% (4% for  industrially processed meat),  due both to more ample  feed and culling to  reduce herd size.  Improved supplies  of meat were less  noticeable than
the  25%  drop  in production of  fruit, 15%  reduction in the potato crop,  and slight decrease  in vegetables.  Despite  two  good harvests  in a row, improvements  in food supply were  so modest as  to  be hardly noticeable,  and supplies  of fruits  and vegetables deteriorated.
Consumers'  experiences in  grocery stores  in  1987  thus were not good,
but neither were they  so bad as  to  trigger a major reassessment of
agricultural policy.  The more acute indicators  of distress  in  1987 were in  the  industrial  sector.  According to  analysis by PlanEcon, growth of GDP  fell to  3.3%  in  1987  compared to 4.5%  in 1986  (Vanous, 1988,  p. 1). Although  the  objectives of the  reform require redirection of  investment from plant and structures  to  equipment and machinery, new projects and incomplete construction continued to  grow in 1987.  The financing  of the
reform  is  inadequate  to  support both perestroika  [restructuring]  and
uskorenie  [acceleration].  Nikolai Shmelev has argued that traditional
sources  of budget revenue were "clearly inadequate"  for  the  task of
modernizing Soviet industry.
The agroindustrial  complex contributes about 12%  of the  traditional
revenues of the Soviet  state budget, but it absorbs  about  25%,  according
to V. Semenov, Vice Minister of Finance of  the USSR, and a noted expert on agricultural  finance  (Semenov, 1987, p. 31).  The  financial burden of agriculture on the state budget has been heavy and growing since  the price
increase  of January 1, 1983.  Furthermore, the  total  burden of agriculture
is  only partially captured by the  budgetary accounts, since uncollectible
agricultural debts held by Gosbank limit  financing of industrial
modernization.  When these debts  are written off, they appear  in the
budget, but until they are formally forgiven they remain in the  Gosbank
accounts  (Semenov, 1985, p.13).  The heavy financial burden of agriculture
and the vulnerability of  the industrial  reform program may have done more to bring  fundamental agricultural reform than shortages  in 1987  of
strawberries, plums, and potatoes.
2If deteriorating farm  finances and increasing competition for
investment  funds brought  the Law on Cooperatives, then  the  objective of
the new agricultural policy is  to make  farms  less  dependent on state
subsidies  and loans without  sacrificing output.  The measure of success
will be not so much  increased output, but better farm finances that
release  funds for  investment in industry.  Lower costs of production,
higher budgetary revenues  through land rent and income and profit taxes,
lower purchase prices by restricting payments of premia for financially
weak farms,  and transfer of debt  from the  state budget  (where it  ends  up
if uncollectible) to  other  agents in the  economy would free budgetary
funds  for higher priority investments.
Greater latitude  to use  farm resources  to  generate revenue and higher
productivity expected from new contracting arrangements are intended to
make the  farms economically viable and rural  incomes sustainable without
the high subsidies currently needed.  The newer forms  of the  collective
contract, particularly  "rental"  [arendnye]  contracts and family contracts
do not have the commitment to  guaranteed wages that necessitated much of
the subsidy and credit  in the past.  Financially weak sovkhozy are being
encouraged to  reorganize as  cooperatives.  In a recently reported sovkhoz
reorganization, workers raised new capital by buying bonds with a 5%
dividend that can be marketed, inherited, or redeemed on demand  ("Sovkhoz
prodaet,"  1988,  p.  10).  Another  sovkhoz near Moscow issued bonds paying
6% annually.  According  to  the  report, the  sovkhoz at the  time of issue
had no prior objectives as  to  the  size  of issue  or what  to  do with the
money raised.  Demand for  the bonds was unexpectedly large and the  sovkhoz
had difficulty spending  the  funds productively, since wholesale  trade in
construction materials and equipment  is  not yet functioning  (Sel'skaia
zhizn',  June 7, 1988,  p.  2).  A heavily indebted collective  farm in
Riazan' province was acquired by the  enterprise Riazan'avtotrans  to
function as  a food producing subsidiary of the  industrial enterprise.  The
industrial partner assumed assets,  all debts, and pending state orders for
output  (Sel'skaia zhizn'.  June  10,  1988).  The benefit  of this new form
of  "sheftsvo"  [involuntary assistance  that urban enterprises give  to  farms
in need]  to  industrial partners  is  questionable, since under the New Law
on the Enterprise  industrial firms  are under pressure  to close  rather than
acquire unprofitable divisions.
New sources  for financing state farms,  redistribution of the burden of
agricultural debt, and greater financial discipline  in the  collective
sector  indicate a new resolve to  cap and reduce  the  growing agricultural
subsidy.  In his commentary on the  Draft Law in May of 1988,  N. I. Ryzhkov
stressed the  financial independence of cooperatives:  "The cooperative  is  a
financially independent  [samookupaemoe]  enterprise.  It cannot--it  is  not
able--to exist if  it  operates at a loss  or with inadequate return.  On the
strength of  this  it  is  vitally necessary that each cooperative have a
structure of production that is  economically sound. . . . After all,  the
state  is not responsible for  the  activities of any  form of cooperative"
("O roli,",  1988, p.  7).
3The  Law on Cooperatives
The Law on Cooperatives was introduced  in draft form  in March of 1988,
and in final form in June of  1988  to take  effect July 1.  The  law sets out
rules for  the  functioning of  the  cooperative sector,  including consumers'
and producers'  cooperatives.  Under the  Law, the collective farm  is a
particular kind of producers' cooperative and part of  the cooperative
sector.  Collective farms,  like all cooperatives,  are subject  to  the
general provisions of the Law on Cooperatives, but a special  section
stipulates  the  particular rights  and obligations  of agricultural
producers'  cooperatives.
Kolkhozy are empowered to  engage in all  legal  productive activities  in
addition to  agriculture.  They have broad rights to  rent  assets  in or out,
on leases of up  to  fifteen years by entering into  contractual relations
with people who may or may not be farm members.  Farms are  encouraged to
enter  into  "rental"  [arendnyel  and other  forms  of collective contracts
with  small groups  of farm members,  including family units, and also with
people who are not farm members.  The right  to  rent land and equipment to
individuals who  are not  farm members  and enter  into  other contractual
relations with nonmembers  effectively sidesteps  the prohibition on hired
labor, and could allow more effective functioning of  local  labor markets.
The  final  text issued  in June of  1988  differs  in several  important
ways  from the  draft  of March, 1988.  One of  these  is  the  autonomy granted
to  farms  in planning and marketing decisions.  Collective  farms will make
their own  five year and annual plans.  According  to  the draft  law,
delivery contracts with procurement organs were  to  serve  as  the basis  for
farms' plans,  and  these  contracts,  in turn,  were  to  be consistent with
state  orders of  the procurement organs  ("Proekt zakon,"  Article 31:2.)
The farms would thus have remained in  the subordinate position  they have
traditionally held in relation to  the procurement organs,  and would have
essentially been subject  to  state orders.  In  the  final text, farms  have
the  explicit right to  sell  to any buyer.  The procurement organs must  fill
their own state orders by providing incentives  for  farms  to  deliver
(Zakon, Article 34:2).
This provision may have  an immediate effect  for products  that need
little processing;  it will have little  impact on processed products,  such
as most grains,  oilseeds, sugar beets, and fibers  unless cooperatives in
processing compete with the  state.  Even for  fruits  and vegetables,  the
effect will depend on implementation of  the  law.  Farms were  granted the
right  in  1986  to  market 30%  of planned sales  of vegetables,  fruits,  and
selected other products  in collective  farm markets  and credit these  sales
toward plan fulfillment, but few farms  took advantage  of  the  right.2
The  final law also differs  from the  draft in its provision  that
collective contract brigades may, with permission of  the  farm management,
become  independent cooperatives  ("Zakon,"  Article 33:4).  They could thus
make planning and marketing decisions  independently of  farm plans  and
marketing commitments.
4The Size of  the Agricultural Subsidy
The  fact that Soviet agriculture  is  subsidized is not in itself
noteworthy.  The  loud and acrimonious discussions about agricultural
subsidies  institutionalized  in  the ongoing renegotiation of agriculture
under the GATT are ready reminders  that the USSR is  not alone with its
subsidy.  The  Soviet Union could even in some quarters earn credit  as  a
country that  is willing unilaterally to  reduce its  agricultural subsidy,
and has  tried,  albeit unsuccessfully,  for years  to  do  so.
The net budgetary flow of resources  into  agriculture, including
production, processing, and transport of  food and fiber,  is large.  V.
Semenov, Vice Minister of Finance of  the USSR, and an expert on
agricultural finance writes that  in 1986 agriculture contributed 50
billion rubles  to  the budget  through profit tax,  income  tax from
collective farms,  and turnover tax  (Semenov, 1987, p. 31).  Much of  this
was  from turnover  tax on alcohol and tobacco. Collective  farms  contributed
only 1.2  billion rubles  in income  tax  (Narkhoz, 1987, p. 628),  and this
was  less than  the earnings  from the  tax on bachelors and spinsters.  The
rate of profitability in the  state  farm sector was somewhat lower  than in
the  collective on about  the  same value of output.
In the  same year, according to  Semenov, the  budgetary allocation to
the agroindustrial complex was  103 billion rubles,  both for investment and
to  cover the  price subsidy.  Agriculture thus  contributes  12%  and absorbs
about  25%  of the  state budget.  With declining sales  of alcohol  and rising
food production, payments from  the budget rise faster than contributions,
and the  subsidy grows.  The budgetary costs  of subsidies are not a good
measure of welfare costs  to society, but without reliable estimates of
consumer and producer surplus, conventional welfare accounting is  not
possible.
The agricultural budgetary subsidy is  paid in several  forms.  The
state makes  direct payments  for projects  in  rural  infrastructure, such as
the  3.3 billion rubles allotted annually since 1982  for  rural  roads  and
infrastructure.  Farms pay discounted prices  for purchase of  tractors,
mineral fertilizer, and agricultural  chemicals,  and the  budget covers  the
difference between the  farm price and the  factory price.  The state makes
direct grants  for investment and current expenses.  Between 1983  and  1985,
of the  total outlays  of state farms  for all purposes,  84.4% came from  farm
earnings  (at  subsidized prices),  4.3%  from short and long term credits,
mostly from Gosbank, and 11.3%  direct payments  from the budget.  In the
collective farm  sector the percentages were respectively 88.3,  7.1,  and
4.6.  Collective farms have traditionally had  less access  to  direct
budgetary payments and have made more use of credit, although grants were
increased as part of  the  Food Program.
The largest portion of the subsidy is  used to  cover  the  difference
between the costs the  state incurs  in procuring, processing, and
transporting agricultural products,  and the  receipts of state stores from
retail  trade in food.  Farm level procurement prices have  increased
5regularly since  1960 to meet rising costs of production in agriculture,
but retail prices of many food  items have remained stable  in state  stores
since 1962.  The  growing difference between state costs  and receipts has
been covered by a direct subsidy.  Recent data on the subsidy are more
complete than earlier data, but generally confirm calculations for  the
1970s made by Vladimir Treml (Treml,  1978).  The size of the price  subsidy
over  time and its breakdown by commodity are shown in Table 1.
Table  1
State Subsidy to  Cover Price Differences
(billion current  rubles)
1960 r. 1965 r. 1970 r. 1975  r. 1980  r. 1985r.  1986r.
Meat and Poultry  1,4  2,8  8,8  12,2  14,0  26,6  27,8
Fish  0,1  0,1  0,2  0,2  0,2  2,2  1,8
Milk  --  2,1  4,0  7,5  18,9  19,2
Grain  _0,3  0,8  0,6  0,8  4,4  4,4
Potatoes, Vegetables,  - - 0,2  0,7  1,4  3,0  3,7
canned goods
Sugar  - - - - 1,0  1,2
Total  1,5  3,2  12,1  19,7  23,9  56,0  57,9
As  % Payments of  2,1  3,2  7,8  9,2  8,1  14,5  14,0
State Budget
Source:  Semenov, "Sovershenstvovanie finansovogo mekhanizma
agropromyshlennogo kompleksa,"  Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistva, No.  9,
1987,  p. 35.
The  58 billion rubles used to  cover differences between farm and
retail prices for output  in 1986  are  often referred to  as  "the
agricultural subsidy."  Payments  to  cover subsidies  for agricultural
machinery and chemicals  in 1986 were about 4 billion rubles.  V. Pavlov,
Chairman of Goskomtsen  indicated in December, 1987  that budgetary
allocations to  cover price differences for both  inputs  and output  in 1988
were 73.4 billion rubles, suggesting that the growth in the subsidy is
accelerating,.  (Sel'skaia zhizn',  December 2, 1987).  Success in the
effort  to  offer more meat to  consumers  automatically raises  the subsidy,
and the  large  increase  in 1987  and  1988  reflects  the  growth  in meat
production.
A fuller accounting  of the budgetary  subsidy requires addition of
other  direct payments, and subtraction of budgetary receipts  to  get the  53
billion rubles  in net payments  for  1986  that  Semenov presents.  Edward
Cook has attempted to  reconstruct flows  between the agro-industrial
complex and the  state budget for  the  period 1975-86, and finds  that
earnings  from turnover tax and to  a lesser degree  from profit tax more
than offset  the  price subsidy and other direct payments to  agriculture
until  the price  increases of 1982  took effect  in January, 1983.  After
61983  the higher prices and increasing proportion of  farms  that qualified
for  special price bonuses coupled with declining earnings  from alcohol
after  1985  to  create  the  large net  flows  (53  billion rubles)  to
agriculture  that Semenov cites  for  1986  (Cook, 1988,  p. 17-19).
According to  Semenov, between 1983 and 1986,  two thirds of  farms received
bonus prices;  a large proportion of agricultural output  is procured at
higher  than base prices  (Semenov, 1987, p. 33).
The data on subsidies do not  include farm indebtedness unless bad
debts are written off  the bank accounts by transfers from  the budget.
When  the Food Program of  1982 went  into  effect in 1983,  9.7  billion rubles
of bad debts were written off,  and 11.1 billion rubles  rescheduled for
repayment  to begin  in 1991.  According to  Semenov, the  total debt of  farms
and other  enterprises  in  the  agro-industrial complex in  1987  was  200
billion rubles,  74 billion of which was past due and rescheduled for
payment between 1988-2000.  Farm debt increased by ten billion rubles
after  the price  increases  of 1983.  Farm indebtedness  and delayed
repayment  thus  contribute to  the  financial constraints that agriculture
places  on perestroika  in industry.
Indebtedness does not  appear in the  subsidy figures  unless bad debts
are written off, but  the  amount rescheduled in 1987  dwarfs  the  11.1
billion rubles postponed in  1982,  and suggests  a farm  financial crisis
that has  grown despite  the  growth in direct subsidy.
The new law on cooperatives speaks  directly to  the problem of farm
indebtedness as  a source of resources flowing  into agriculture.  Farm
credit for  the collective  sector was  eased as  part of  the  Food Program of
1982,  and  is  now  to be  tightened up.  The combination of  less  generous
lending,  lower costs  of production passed on  to  the  state through rental
payments and somewhat higher earnings from profits, and a moderate
increase  in retail prices  may bring the  agricultural budgetary accounts
into closer balance without raising retail prices  fully to  cover costs of
production.
The financial  restructuring of agriculture  will be  difficult in the
next few years.  The switchover to  fuller cost accounting at the  farm
level  is  not likely to  succeed unless much of the  inherited debt is
written off, or passed to new partners through merger of poor  farms with
financially stronger  industrial  enterprises  in exchange  for preferential
access to  food.  The  farm financial crisis should be seen as  another
dimension of  the  subsidy problem.
Subsidized Food:  Who Gains  and How Much?
The  Law on Cooperatives  reflects  a new resolve to  reduce  the
agricultural  subsidy, and  introduces  changes in resource use intended to
accomplish the financial restructuring without sacrificing output,  and
without transferring the  full cost  to  consumers.  This could be very
welcome news  to  consumers who have been reminded often by Gorbachev that
food subsidies  are costly and must be  reduced.  Until recently an increase
in retail  food prices has been the  solution to  the  subsidy problem most
7often offered in discussion.  Consumers have been told that food prices
will go up,  and that they will be compensated for  the  increase with an as
yet unspecified increase  in wages, pensions,  stipends, and/or  a family
allowance based on need.  The financial  restructuring begun in 1988
suggests  that the subsidy problem will be attacked on the supply side, as
well as  the  demand side,  and the  resulting increases in retail  food prices
can be less  than  if the demand side carried the whole burden of
adjustment.
Gorbachev opened the  question of  agricultural subsidies  in his speech
in Tselinograd  in September,  1985,  in which he  stated, "Demand for  some
products exceeds  supply.  This  is  connected with the  fact  that cash
incomes  in our country have grown faster  than food production. At the  same
time,  the  state prices  for basic products  have  remained virtually
unchanged  for two decades.  For instance,  meat is  sold in our  stores at
prices that  are only one-third to  one-half the outlays  on  its production"
(Pravda, September 11,  1985,  p.l).  He went on  to note that low prices
encouraged waste of products  that were  in short  supply.
Gorbachev's  comment was  the first  indication that a change  in retail
food pricing was being entertained by political leaders.  Subsequent
discussion has made consumers aware of  the magnitude of  the problem;  the
prices  that consumers pay  on average  for all  foods  except  alcoholic
beverages  cover only  two  thirds  of  the  full  costs  of buying, processing,
transporting, and retailing food.  The  state pays  the  difference  in direct
subsidy, which  is  only part  of the  full  agricultural subsidy, since inputs
are subsidized, and  the  state makes  direct grants  and subsidized loans  to
agriculture.
Gorbachev has announced  that retail food prices will  be  included in
the  general price reform of  1990-91, but that price changes will be
compensated to maintain living standards.  In October, 1987,  in a speech
in Murmansk, he  said,  "The State pays  collective and state farms  50%  to
100% more  for output delivered, first of all animal-husbandry output,  than
the price at which this  output  is  sold to  the  population.  In  this
connection,  last year subsidies  for  the  sale of meat and milk totaled 57
billion rubles.  But many people neither feel  nor know about this
situation....  Therefore, no  one economizes  on foodstuffs or  takes  a
thrifty attitude toward them.  If we  take  the price of bread in  the
Soviet Union.as 1, its price  is  5.5  times higher in  the United States  of
America, 3.6  times higher in Great Britain, 4.1  times higher  in France,
3.6  times higher  in  the  FRG,  and 1.5  times  higher in Hungary....  So  there
is  a problem, and  it must be  solved.  But an approach must be  found that
will not lower the working people's  living standard."  (Pravda and
Izvestia, Oct.2,  1987.)
Discussions of  agricultural pricing have implied  that higher retail
prices will be  the main instrument  for reducing the subsidy, and have
generated concern about  the magnitude of  the  impending price increases.
For example,  D. M. Kazakevich, an economist with the Siberian section of
the Academy of Sciences argued in January of  1986  that food prices  should
be  raised to  cover full costs of production, transport, processing, and
8retailing (Kazakevich,  1986,  p.33 - 4 3).  Nikolai Shmelyov has argued, "In
the  final analysis, why should a person underpay for meat and overpay for
textiles and footwear, rather  than buy them all  at real prices?
(Shmelyov, 1987,  pp. 142-158.  )  Readers reacting to Kazakevich's  argument
expressed apprehension about compensation and questioned whether  the  full
adjustment need come  from consumers;  could producers  not bring down high
costs of production?  The Law on Cooperatives  suggests  new efforts  to
contain the  subsidy on the  supply  side, perhaps  in recognition that large
price  increases are not feasible until some tangible benefits of
perestroika can be  demonstrated.
Proponents  of higher retail  food prices have argued that prices
should both recover  costs of production and processing, and bring
equilibrium  to  food markets  now in chronic and ubiquitous  disequilibrium.
The  dual goals  are  in conflict with  the consumption targets  of the  Food
Program for many commodities, and commitment  to  the consumption targets
remains strong.  The  commodity breakdown of  the price  subsidy shown in
Table  1 indicates that  about 80%  of  it  is  for meat and milk.  If retail
prices for meat and dairy products were raised  to recover high costs of
production, excess  supply would very likely appear at current  levels of
consumption of  63 kilograms  of meat annually per capita.  The  targeted
quantity of 70  kilograms per capita by 1990  would go  unsold if  offered to
consumers at  full unsubsidized cost.
The  disequilibrium in markets  other than meat and dairy  is probably
not  as  great.  Stories  of rural people feeding bread to pigs  and pictures
of children playing soccer with bread are correctly indicative of
distortions  in grain pricing, but the  absolute magnitude of subsidies in
other markets  is  small  compared to meat and milk.
Different meat and milk products  are subsidized at different rates,  as
can be  seen in the  following figures from  1985:
Table 2
Retail  Prices and State Cost Per Kilogram
of Animal Products  (rubles,  1985)
Poultry  Beef  Lamb  Pork  Milk  Butter
Average Retail Prices  2,57  1,75  1,42  1,84  0,25  3,38
State Cost  2,92  5,42  4,86  3,51  0,45  8,43
Excess of state costs  .35  3,67  3,44  1,67  0,20  5,05
over retail price
Source:  V. Semenov,  "Sovershenstvovanie finansovogo mekhanizma
agropromyshlennogo kompleksa,"  Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistva 9, 1987  p.
34.
9Price policies used to  implement  the  subsidy are highly regressive,
and have historically redistributed  income  toward wealthier urban
residents  of cities of  European USSR and away  from poorer rural people and
those  in Noneuropean parts  of the country.  Gorbachev has recognized the
regressive nature of the  subsidies:  "Families with large incomes consume
more meat and milk, and, consequently, they make greater use of these
subsidies"  (Pravda and Izvestia, Oct. 2, 1987).  According to A. Komin,
Vice Chairman of Goskomtsen, budget surveys  indicate that families with
per capita incomes less  than 50  rubles pay 20%  to  30% more for meat than
families with per capita incomes  of 150  rubles per month, because the
latter have better access  to supplies  at official state prices  (Izvestiia,
date).
Food consumption differs by region  in  the USSR, as  in most large
countries.  The age  structure of  the population, regional disparities  in
income, historic dietary habits,  and difference  in the  availability of
food products contribute to  differences  in food consumption.  The  data on
per capita meat consumption by republic are  incomplete, but  indicate a
wide dispersion around the national  average of 63  kilograms annually.
Consumption in the wealthier Baltic Republics is  as  high as  80  kilograms
per capita, while in Central Asia, where incomes  are  lower and families
have more children, consumption is  approximately 30  kilos per capita.
Partial data  on meat consumption are  shown in Table  3.  Regional
disparities  in distribution of  the subsidy have been recognized in  Soviet
commentaries;  "a resident of Leningrad receives  through subsidies  2.5
times more than a resident of Balashov  [Lower Volga region of  the RSFSR]




1975  1980  1985
USSR  57  58  61
Estonia  80  80
Lithuania  76  -
Latvia 
Belorussia  62  61  70
RSFSR  60  62  67
Ukraine  60  60  66
Kazakhstan  -53  52
Moldavia  46  49  54
Georgia  - -
Armenia  - -
Azerbaidzhan  32  32
Tadzhikistan  - -
Turkmenia  47
Uzbekistan  29
Kirghizia  32  29
Source:  Narkhoz,  various  republics and years.
10The  income  transfers associated with the price  subsidy come not from
consuming meat, but from buying it  in state stores.  Meat sold outside the
state network is  not subsidized except  through input costs.  On average
throughout  the  country just over one quarter  of the meat consumed is
purchased outside  of the state network, at collective farm markets,
intravillage markets, or consumed by its producers.  Sales of  food in
state outlets  are greater  in urban than rural  areas, and this  is
particularly true for meat and milk.
The  commitment to  keep retail prices constant while both  incomes  and
procurement prices  increased has  thus benefitted those who buy more  than
average  quantities of meat and milk at  state prices.  Most of  these  are
urban residents  of European parts of  the USSR with higher than average
incomes.  The  Soviet experience  is  not unique;  nontargeted food subsidies
are usually regressive, particularly if  they are applied to commodities
with high income  elasticities, such  as  animal products.  This  is  true
despite  the often stated objectives of  food subsidy programs  to benefit
the poor by lowering the  cost of a basic necessity.  The poor  do  gain, but
the  rich gain more  from nontargeted subsidy programs.  Subsidy programs
that benefit the poor more than the  rich are  those  targeted through
eligibility requirements.
The  real benefits  to  the  recipients  of the  subsidy are  less  than the
budgetary costs.  The state may pay  73  billion rubles  in subsidy, but
consumers  receive considerably less  than that  amount.  In  the  case of
beef, for example, full  state costs  are about 5.50  per kilo.  Base
procurement prices for  beef range  from 1450  rubles per ton  (live weight)
in the Ukraine, Moldavia, and Kirgizia to  2000 rubles  per  ton  (live
weight) in Armenia, and most beef is probably bought at a base price  of
1450  to  1600 rubles.  Data  in  the  1987 Armenian Narkhoz  indicate  a 50%
yield of meat, or a base farm price  for meat of about 3000  rubles.  Added
on  to  the base price are bonuses for quality, quantity, and financial
need, suggesting that the  farm gate price  for beef  (meat) may on average
be  about 4 rubles per  kilo.  This leaves  a rather small margin for
processing, transport, and storage, and probably explains why little
service  is embodied in the  final product.
At 1.75 rubles  retail, beef is  in excess demand.  Rationing is
accomplished either directly, through distribution at the workplace, or
indirectly, through queueing, bribes,  tied sales,  and other mechanisms
that bring  the market to equilibrium.  The price for beef on collective
farm markets  in Moscow in  1987 was between 5.50 and 7 rubles per kilo,  and
the state price  for beef in Moscow  (second price zone)  is  2 rubles per
kilo.  According  to data  released by Goskomstat in November, 1987,  the
average price  of beef in collective  farm markets  in 264 cities was 4.89
rubles per kilo  in 1987.  Market prices  for other foods  are given in Table
4.3
11Table 4
Average  Food Prices in Urban Collective  Farm Markets
in September (in 264 cities)
(rubles and kopecks per kilo)
1987  r.
State
of which  Prices
1986  r.  total  Collective  Kolkhozniki  Price
and State  and other  Zone
farms  citizens  II
potatoes  0-52  0-58  0-33  0-59  0-10
cabbage  0-54  0-66  0-28  0-74  0-12
onions  0-74  0-69  0-43  0-71  0-70
green onions  1-95  1-96  0-50  2-00  0-50
carrots  0-76  0-80  0-35  0-82  0-20
cucumber  1-30  1-28  0-71  1-35  1-00
tomatoes  0-80  0-94  0-34  0-99  0-50
dill  2-30  2-31  0-72  2-34  0-60
parsley  2-30  2-36  0-73  2-38  0-60
garlic  3-04  3-10  2-03  3-10  2-00
apples  1-14  1-45  0-53  1-50  0-70
beef  4-86  4-89  3-35  4-93  2-00
lamb  5-10  5-14  2-97  5-17  1-90
pork  4-46  4-52  3-49  4-53  2-10
salt pork  4-14  4-07  2-47  4-07  2-40
animal  fat  7-42  8-33  7-50  8-33  3-60
Source:  Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, No. 45,  November,  1987, p. 11.
If the quality difference between state and collective farm markets  is
taken into  account,  an equilibrium price on the  collective farm market of
4.50  to  5 rubles per kilo for beef would suggest a market clearing price
in the state sector of between 3 and 3.50 rubles per kilo.  In a recent
account of meat markets  in Omsk oblast',  a journalist reported that half
of the meat consumed comes  from the  private sector and subsidiary
production of  factories.  Supplies  of meat on collective farm markets  in
Omsk are reported to be  plentiful, and the  prevailing price  is  3.50 rubles
per kilo.  ("Pochemu pustuiut,"  p. 10)  Market clearing prices will vary
both with supply and demand, but a level of 3 to  3.50 rubles per kilo  for
the central  industrial region seems  reasonable.
Consumers  pay approximately  the  market clearing price, giving  1.75
rubles directly to  the  state,  and dividing the  remaining 1.25  to  1.75
rubles between direct and  indirect payments  to employees  of retail  trade,
12and the deadweight loss  of standing in line.  The additional payments to
the  retail network are  in the  form of  tied sales,  short weights,
substandard quality,  and explicit gifts and bribes. The  difference between
1.75 per  kilo and the market clearing price should not be  considered a
benefit to  consumers, since consumers pay the higher price.  If retail
prices  are raised to  market clearing  levels,  consumers would need very
little  if any compensation to be equally well off after  the change.
Employees  in retail  trade, however, would lose  the  chance to  earn income
"on the  side",  and could be  compensated through change  in the  wage
structure  in retail trade.
The real gain  that consumers realize from  the subsidy program is  the
addition to  consumer surplus generated by the  opportunity to buy beef at
market clearing prices  instead of the high supply price  that  the
government pays.
When retail prices are  increased to  reduce the  subsidy,  two  steps  in
the price adjustment are  important.  The move  from 1.75  rubles  to  about 3
rubles  (assumed to  clear markets of existing quantities)  can be made with
little or no  diminution in consumer welfare, and little need for
compensation.  A token compensation and ready availability of the product
at posted prices  would probably suffice.  Further adjustment  in  the range
between market clearing prices and full  state costs would create excess
supply and undercut the  consumption goals  of  the Food Program.  The  income
compensation necessary to  leave  consumers equally well off if beef prices
went all  the way up  to  5.50  per kilo would be very great.  An even larger
compensation would be necessary to  induce  consumers  to buy currently
available quantities  of meat at that price.
Thus  the  thorny issue  of how  to  raise food prices without reducing
standards of  living is  both easier and more  difficult  than it  appears.
Prices can be  raised to market clearing levels with little  need for
compensation.  Very high costs of production that exceed demand prices  for
a target level of consumption cannot be  recovered from consumers without
causing  excess supply  that undermines  the  consumption goals.  The goal  of
the Food Program is  to  offer  70 kilos of meat per capita in 1990.  If
retail prices are kept as  low as  they are  today, meeting this  target will
not be perceived as  a significant success,  since people will still seek to
buy more meat than is  available;  "shortages" will persist.  On the  other
hand,  if retail prices were raised fully  to recover high costs of
production, consumers would not take  70 kilos per capita off markets  even
if  it were avilable.
This  contradiction between market clearing prices and nonsubsidized
prices  is  a puzzling  lacuna in the discussions  of pending increases in
retail  food prices.  Price  theory and "commodity money relations" have
achieved a new and important emphasis, but  it  is often assumed that market
clearing and nonsubsidized prices  are synonymous.  They are not,  unless
consumption targets can be changed to  let markets  clear at nonsubsidized
prices.  Continued commitment to  the  consumption goals  of the Food Program
is  inconsistent with market clearing prices  that fully cover high costs of
production.  Unless  the  consumption targets are  revised, only part of  the
13subsidy can be recovered by raising retail prices.  The remainder must
come from lower costs  of production.
Potential for cost reduction  is  great.  Carcass yields and milk yields
per cow are low, and can be improved  through better breeds and higher
quality feed.  The  soybean  imports  announced in 1987  are part of  a new
effort  to  improve  feed productivity by  increasing the protein quantity.
As  long as  costs of production are so high,  there  is  little room for
additional expenditures on processing and marketing.  The US  retail price
of beef is  about  $5.38 per kilo  (standard grade),  and about  57%  of  this
goes  to  the farmer.  Soviet total costs  for beef are  5.50 rubles per kilo,
and probably in excess of  75%  of this  now goes  to  the farm.  Frozen meat
and poultry were  imported from Hungary in 1985  for  less  than one ruble per
kilo.  Supplies of meat from Eastern Europe are  limited, but  inexpensive
cuts  from Western Europe  are readily available,  and, at the official
exchange  rate, are much cheaper than Soviet products.  High  farm level
prices maintain a very high rate of protection for Soviet producers.
Improvements  in food processing and packaging would probably  increase
consumers'  acceptance of higher retail prices, but there  is  little margin
for processing unless protection or costs of production are reduced.
The changes  in agricultural policy in 1988 are  the  most meaningful attempt
so  far  to  remedy high costs of production.
Consumers will expect compensation for price  increases,  even though
welfare will be  little reduced unless prices  are raised above market
clearing levels.  The  average  Soviet family in  1986 spent  36%  of after  tax
income on  food (Narkhoz, 1987).  The  real expenditure was probably higher,
since actual prices paid  in  state stores were higher  than official prices.
But  the proportion of money income now used for  food, and the  fear  that
expenditures on the  same  volume of food would have  to  increase by 50%  if
the state decided to  recover  70 billion rubles of  subsidy through higher
prices explain the  general nervousness about  food price  increases  and
compensation.
The  increase  in retail  food prices  that is politically  feasible and
makes economic sense will not generate enough revenue to remove  the
agricultural subsidy.  Consumers  have been repeatedly assured that they
will be  compensated, and compensation will absorb most of  the  revenues.
A reduction in  the subsidy of  30 billion rubles annually would fund a wage
increase of about 10%.  The wage  increase  is  a poor instrument for
compensating changes  in food prices, but  it may defuse  some of the
political sensitivity of the  issue.  Those who  consume  a lot of meat and
milk will be  undercompensated and  those who benefitted little from  the
subsidy in the past over compensated by the wage  increase. The  regressive
nature of  the  subsidies  in the past makes  across  the board compensation
preferable to  compensating actual  losers, but  it will not  fulfill  the
pledge to  maintain standards of living.
With higher wages  and higher  relative prices of  food, consumers will
choose  to  shift  some of their expenditures  to  other consumables.  They
will be better off after the  increase if prices  do not exceed market
14clearing prices, wages are  increased,  and more other consumer items are
available.  Those who consumed little meat will probably be
overcompensated for price  increases.  Those who formerly bought a lot of
meat will be undercompensated, but at higher incomes and higher meat
prices would be more than willing to buy consumer electronics, better
clothing, high quality day care and other  services if these  items are more
available  than in the  past.  If  the poor performance of the  consumer
sector in 1987  continues and  is not remedied by imports, higher food
prices compensated by higher incomes will lead to  greater disequilibria,
more black market activity, and more inflation.  Compensation for higher
food prices must  include  greater availability of other consumer goods  with
high income  elasticities.  Redirection of  investment into  consumer goods
thus  should precede the  increase  in food prices.
Management of  the program to bring down  the  subsidy on the  demand side
through price increases depends  on success  in  the effort  to  reduce the
subsidy on the supply side.  Funds  for  investment  in consumer  goods must
come from somewhere,  and  the expensive agricultural  sector is  a likely
source.  The farm financial crisis  is doubly  linked to retail  food prices;
the problems have arisen together, and neither can be  solved independently
of the other.  The Law on Cooperatives, new forms of contracting, and new
financing for  state  farms  may permit Soviet  farms  to  produce  at least as
much as  they have  in  the past with lower costs  of production and lower
subsidies.  If so,  then agriculture's contribution  to perestroika could be
moderately increasing food supply, subsidy funds  freed  for investment to
retool  industry and provide more consumption goods,  and a price  reform
that proceeds  on schedule  in 1990/91.
15Footnotes
1.  Assistant  Professsor, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Minnesota, St.  Paul,  Minnesota.
This work was supported by The Graduate School, University of
Minnesota.  I thank Barbara Severin for comments on an earlier draft.
2.  A manager  of a dairy farm near Tbilisi commented in conversation with
the author in 1987  that in a milk importing region such as  Tbilisi,
local  officials would not permit  sales on collective  farm markets when
state institutions,  such as  schools and day care  centers, needed milk.
3.  Fruits  are poorly represented in  the  price data;  fruit prices  in  fall
of 1987 would have been unusually high on collective farm markets  due
to  the  severe drop  in production during that year.
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